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Model-free and model-based learning and
control
Trolley problemWhat is distinctive about a bringing a learning perspective to moral psychology? Part of the answer lies in
the remarkable transformations that have taken place in learning theory over the past two decades,
which have revealed how powerful experience-based learning can be in the acquisition of abstract causal
and evaluative representations, including generative models capable of attuning perception, cognition,
affect, and action to the physical and social environment. When conjoined with developments in neuro-
science, these advances in learning theory permit a rethinking of fundamental questions about the acqui-
sition of moral understanding and its role in the guidance of behavior. For example, recent research
indicates that spatial learning and navigation involve the formation of non-perspectival as well as ego-
centric models of the physical environment, and that spatial representations are combined with learned
information about risk and reward to guide choice and potentiate further learning. Research on infants
provides evidence that they form non-perspectival expected-value representations of agents and actions
as well, which help them to navigate the human environment. Such representations can be formed by
highly-general mental processes such as causal and empathic simulation, and thus afford a foundation
for spontaneous moral learning and action that requires no innate moral faculty and can exhibit substan-
tial autonomy with respect to community norms. If moral learning is indeed integral with the acquisition
and updating of casual and evaluative models, this affords a new way of understanding well-known but
seemingly puzzling patterns in intuitive moral judgment—including the notorious ‘‘trolley problems.”
 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
A query to Google Books requesting an Ngram from 1950
onwards for the phrasemoral development reveals that this expres-
sion underwent a dramatic growth in frequency from 1960 to
1980, before declining gradually to 2008 (the latest year for which
results are given). Adding an Ngram for social learning shows that
this expression followed essentially the same trajectory, climbing
yet more dramatically to its 1980 peak before drifting downward
in recent years. But request an Ngram for moral learning during
the same period, and the Ngram Viewer draws a blank. Which
leads to the question: If there already are well-established research
literatures in moral development and social learning, what might a
moral learning perspective add?
The existing literatures in moral development and social learn-
ing are far too varied and extensive, and the field of moral learning
far too undeveloped, to permit more than a preliminary compar-
ison and contrast. Certainly there is much by way of overlap. A
moral learning approach shares with social learning theory the
idea that much of our learning takes place by observing others,rather than through direct external reward or punishment. And it
shares with moral development theory the idea that our capacity
for moral thought emerges over time, drawing upon the develop-
ment of capacities in other domains.
However, a moral learning approach sees the acquisition of
moral understanding as the result of domain-general learning pro-
cesses, and thus as an integral part of our modeling of the physical
and social world. Such modeling generates expectations continu-
ously that guide perception, thought, and action, and permit learn-
ing from discrepancies with expectation throughout life. Moral
learning therefore can go beyond the acquisition of known moral
concepts or internalization of prevailing social norms, and can
extend to the formation of novel moral concepts and evaluations,
resulting in dramatic personal and social change even within one
lifetime.
In this paper, I will examine a series of issues, consideration of
which makes it possible to give more substance to a moral learning
perspective. Section 2 will present criteria for distinctively moral
learning. Section 3 will look at causal and evaluative learning as
exemplars of the kind of learning moral learning might be, and
ask why now is a particularly apt moment for asking about the
power of learning. Section 4 will then apply the model-based.1016/j.
2 P. Railton / Cognition xxx (2016) xxx–xxxpicture of learning developed in Section 3 to the moral case,
presenting evidence for the acquisition of non-perspectival evalu-
ative representations that satisfy the criteria presented in Section 2.
Section 5 will look into the phenomenon of ‘‘intuitive judgment,”
and use informal student polling data to ask how a ‘‘deep” moral
learning perspective might account for the puzzling patterns of
intuitive moral judgment found in ‘‘trolley problems.” And
Section 6 will conclude by briefly considering how explicit and
implicit processes interact in moral learning.2. Identifying the subject matter
Learning is a success term, and if moral learning is to be an inte-
gral part of the knowledge we gain in representing ourselves and
the world, then it must be subject to some notion of representa-
tional success. Does this require a theory of moral learning to take
a stand on which moral theory is correct—seemingly in violation of
David Hume’s celebrated distinction between is and ought
(1738/1978)?
It is possible, however, for a theory of moral learning to bracket
many controversial moral questions by focusing instead on criteria
of moral evaluation that are shared across a wide range of norma-
tive moral theories. Just as we can speak of criteria characteristic of
a scientific point of view that are implicitly or explicitly followed by
those pursuing competing theories, we can speak of criteria char-
acteristic of amoral point of view. It is thanks to such shared criteria
that there can be a scientific or moral ‘‘community,” with shared
methods and questions, and meaningful disagreement over
answers.
Scientific and moral inquiry both aspire to a kind of objectivity
that overcomes the limitations of subjective or sectarian perspec-
tives or interests by following methods, and seeking understanding
and justification, that are (i) impartial, (ii) general, (iii) consistent
(or, more broadly, coherent), and (iv) independent of appeals to
special authority. For example, both require that like cases be treated
alike, and that the evidence or grounds given in defense of
particular positions be in principle shareable. Moreover, competing
parties to moral and scientific disputes agree that their disputes
are not merely speculative. That is, they see themselves as
seeking to answer questions about what to believe and how to
apply this in practice—whether this is a matter of accepting a
scientific hypothesis, following a methodological norm, or deciding
upon an ethical course of action. Let us call this the criterion
of (v) thought- and action-guidingness. One could hardly make
sense of the intensity of scientific andmoral disputes if one thought
that making up one’s mind in scientific or moral disputes were a
merely notional matter, with no relevance to how we should think
and act.
Of course, moral disputes also differ from scientific disputes in a
number of respects. For example, morality has a proprietary, non-
instrumental concern with questions of (vi) the harm or benefit of
those actually or potentially affected. Scientists of course are not
indifferent to such questions, but they are not treated as an essen-
tial part of the evidence or grounds for scientific judgment. Crite-
rion (vi) does not say that impartial concern with harm or
benefit is the entire basis of morality, as some utilitarians maintain,
but rather that harm and benefit have direct relevance to moral
judgment across the full array of major ethical traditions—includ-
ing deontologies (which typically include duties not to harm and
to render assistance to those in need) and virtue theories (which
typically connect virtue with human flourishing, and identify
beneficence and generosity as central virtues).
To study moral learning or scientific learning, then, it is not
necessary to embrace a particular substantive theory or to provide
a definition of morality or science—it is enough to study howPlease cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
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forms of inquiry or ways of regulating thought and action that
exhibit such features as (i)–(v) or (i)–(vi).
From an evolutionary standpoint, it can appear quite extraordi-
nary that people would impose upon themselves the limitations of
forms of inquiry and practice that would meet criteria (i)–(v) or
(i)–(vi). Why would natural selection favor the development of
mental processes or social dispositions that can be so independent
of the reproductive interests of individuals and their kith and kin?
Answering this question is one of the key challenges faced by
accounts of scientific or moral learning—and we will have some-
thing to say about it, below.3. Causal and evaluative learning
3.1. Philosophical background
Hume framed one of the foundational texts of modern philoso-
phy, A Treatise of Human Nature (1738/1978), in terms of the joint
problem of understanding how we arrive at the attitudes we do on
the basis of experience, and whether these attitudes are warranted.
Hume focused especially on causal and moral beliefs, and perhaps
surprisingly, the author of the is/ought distinction emphasized the
fundamental similarities of these two forms of domains of thought.
Hume saw that there is a general problem of bridging the gap
between sensory impressions, which are particular, concrete,
actual, and transient, and what we come to believe on their basis,
which is general, abstract, modal, and temporally-extensive. How,
he asked, do we come to form causal and moral beliefs which log-
ically outstrip all our evidence, and what does this tell us about
how or why they might nonetheless be justified?
Hume concluded that we must add something to sensation to
bridge this gap. Earlier philosophers had often invoked innate
ideas, yet these could not really solve the problem he had identi-
fied. After all, innateness is not validity, and even if we were
endowed with valid general, abstract ideas or rules, we would still
have to figure out how to apply these to particular, transient,
unruly experiences, or to decisions or actions in concrete contexts.
Abstract concepts and rules do not apply themselves, and to appeal
to yet other innate concepts or rules to tell us how and when to
apply them would be to launch a regress—and ‘‘it is impossible
for us to carry on our inferences in infinitum” (1738/1978; sect. I.
iii.4).
Hume’s answer is that imaginative projection effects the bridge
that strictly logical inference cannot. He posited general, default
psychological dispositions to respond to certain regularities in sen-
sory experience by mentally extending these patterns to novel
experiences and abstract relations of similarity and difference.
Forming expectations on the basis of such default projective dispo-
sitions might seem to be epistemically reckless, but Hume argued
that, by ‘‘spreading itself over the world” in this way, belief could
make experience into trial-and-error experimentation. Belief for
Hume is an active sentiment rather than a mere idea, and its projec-
tive ‘‘initial impulse” will be ‘‘broke into pieces” in response to the
proportion of success or failure in expectation (1738/1978; sect. I.
ii.12). Although Hume is often considered an outright skeptic, on a
more plausible interpretation he combined skepticism about the
powers of pure reason with realism about the ways sentiments
such as belief can ground us in reality and attune our thought
and action to the world. Indeed, he claimed, logical reasoning itself
can avoid regress only because belief projects spontaneously along
the network of the ‘‘association of ideas” via relations of similarity
and analogy—if such default mental operations cannot be trusted,
then reasoning cannot be trusted either (1738/1978; conclusion
of Book 1).hy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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attunement. In the imaginative projections that guide our lives as
continuing agents situated in a social world, sympathy presents
to us simulated experience of what it is like to occupy perspectives
other than our own current point of view. This gives experiential
reality and force both to our own possible fate in the future and
to the potential weal or woe of others. As a result, we tend sponta-
neously to approve of actions, practices, and states of character not
only insofar as these benefit our current selves and those closest to
us, but also in light of their tendencies toward longer-term or more
general benefit or harm (1738/1978; sect. III.iii.6). No innate first
principles are needed for us to discover the distinction between
virtue and vice, and the mechanisms by which we make this dis-
covery connects this abstract distinction to concrete experience
and circumstances, and to what moves us to action (1738/1978,
Conclusion of Book III).
3.2. A contemporary convergence: Hume 2.0
Today the successors to Hume’s epistemology are found in such
theories as reinforcement learning and Bayesian updating. These
learning processes are by their nature expectation-based or projec-
tive—and recent years have shown us that they are much more
powerful in generating discrimination, intelligence, abstract gener-
alization, and even creative action than they were previously imag-
ined to be (Le et al., 2012; Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2016;
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011).
Probabilistic models of spontaneous belief formation and revi-
sion had been long dismissed as psychologically unrealistic, and
at odds with people’s actual ‘‘intuitive” judgments (Kahneman,
2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). But in the last two decades,
developments in neuroscience have provided evidence that these
models might be realistic after all, as actual neural processes are
observed to approximate such models in sensory coding, visual
discrimination and search, and reinforcement learning (Dayan &
Daw, 2008; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Ma, Navalpakkam, Beck, van
den Berg, & Pouget, 2011; Schultz, 2002).
Simultaneously, theoretical work on hierarchical neural nets
and Bayesian causal graphs provided plausible pictures of how
the brain might use expectation-based feedback to build abstract
generative models of perceptual inputs (Hinton, 2007; Holyoak &
Cheng, 2011; Pearl, 2009). And theoretical and applied work in
motor control showed how such models could guide behavior opti-
mally, in ways that yielded a good approximation of actual move-
ment (Berthier, Rosenstein, & Barto, 2005; Liu & Todorov, 2007). To
complete the picture, these same models used inversely exhibited
a good fit for how humans perceive similarity, attribute causation
and intention, ‘‘break belief into pieces” to guide behavior, and use
variation in outcomes to assess risk and adjust learning rate
(Behrens, Woolrich, Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; Knill & Pouget,
2004; Kording & Wolpert, 2006). (For a critical perspective on
probabilistic and optimizing approaches, see Marcus & Davis,
2013.)
It was the challenge of spatial navigation that first gave rise to
the idea that intelligent animals construct persistent models of
the world around them, and use these ‘‘cognitive maps” to guide
choice and action (Tolman, 1948). Recently, developments in neu-
roimaging have made it possible to study in detail the formation
and use of ‘‘cognitive maps” as an animal learns a maze
(Langston, Ainge, & Covey, 2010)—combining information from
vision, touch, motion, and head direction to create perspectival
and non-perspectival representations of place and space. These
representations can guide navigation flexibly by dynamic updating
(Moser, Kropff, & Moser, 2008), and can promote ‘‘off-line” learning
as well. When the rat rests or sleeps, repeated activations occur in
these representations (Foster & Wilson, 2006; Ji & Wilson, 2007).Please cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
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include directions of motion the rat did not experience as well as
those it did, and activation focuses especially in regions of the
maze less frequently explored—a pattern typical of a learner seek-
ing to extract maximum information from a body of data, rather
than a creature of habit caught in the mental ‘‘grooves” of the
most-entrenched past patterns (Gupta, van der Meer, Touretzky,
& Redish, 2010).
Moreover, during these bouts of re-activation, something sur-
prising occurs: ‘‘short cut” paths never taken begin to be con-
structed (Gupta et al., 2010). It perhaps should not be surprising
that mammals, shaped over hundreds of millions of generations
to be successful foragers under conditions of scarcity, would be
built to exploit the energy-saving strategy of building up and
exploring a landscape mentally on the basis of partial information,
leveraging experience to prepare novel responses that might prove
more effective or efficient. Such simulation and comparison of pos-
sibilities appears to be an intrinsically-motivated activity of mind,
enriching spatial representations even in the absence of new exter-
nal cues or rewards.
Simulation and comparison of pathways also takes place ‘‘on
line,” as the rat negotiates the maze. Once it has had a chance to
explore a maze, and before it reaches the point of overtraining,
as a rat approaches an important choice-point, activation in its
mental map spreads transiently forward down the alternate paths
ahead (Johnson & Redish, 2007). And if the chosen action fails to
live up to expectations—for example, if the rat does not hear the
click of the food-tray window opening up ahead—activation in
the mental map can then spread backward down the other arm
of the maze, and the animal reverses direction (Johnson &
Redish, 2007).
Ethologists had observed as early as the 1970s that animals in
natural or controlled environments manage to develop near-
optimal foraging strategies, as determined by the animals’ ener-
getic and nutritive needs, the distances traveled, the likelihood of
finding a given resource at a location, the marginal rate of return
from a resource, and the need to explore as well as exploit
(Dugatkin, 2004; Krebs, Ryan, & Charnov, 1974). It would appear,
then, that reinforcement learning is capable of providing action-
guiding information sufficient for this complex task. Evidence sug-
gests that rats build mental models of causal structure (Blaisdell,
Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006), and that monkeys use mental
models to ‘‘work backwards” from desired outcomes to planned
actions, and to form predictive expectations regarding novel cases
via abstraction and analogy (Tanji, Shima, & Mushiake, 2007).
Expectation-based action-guidance via imaginative projection
and simulation turns out to be just as central to intelligence as
Hume imagined, and even more pervasive. Evidently, the
metabolically-expensive brains needed for effective ‘‘prospection”
paid their way evolutionarily (Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, &
Sripada, 2013, 2016).
3.3. Learning and nativism
As in Hume’s day, talk of the power of learning naturally gives
rise to questions about the relative contribution of experience-
based learning vs. innate knowledge or ‘‘modules.” Of course, any
learning system depends upon some unlearned structures—for
example, the default dispositions and ‘‘priors” needed to start
error-based or Bayesian learning, or the neural structures that
underlie the general capacity for reinforcement learning and
model-based control. The answer to ‘‘nature vs. nurture” is always
both, but what recent advances have placed in question, however,
are long-standing assumptions about the need to posit more exten-
sive and substantive innate knowledge or ‘‘modules” to explain
how the mind bridges the gap between actual, limited sensationhy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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structures. Perhaps more generic learning processes with revisable
priors can do the job.
For example, it has long been argued that human infants must
have something akin to an innate ‘‘linguistic faculty” or ‘‘language
module,” since they manage almost universally to acquire an open-
ended syntactic and semantic competence in their native tongue
on the basis of relatively limited amounts of data or instruction—
the ‘‘poverty of the stimulus” argument (for a review, see Pullum
& Scholz, 2002). Such explanations, though, still face the Humean
problem mentioned at the outset: even to engage such a module
the infant must develop very considerable open-ended, abstract,
generalizing capacities using equally ‘‘impoverished” stimuli. In
the case of language, the infant must already have achieved consid-
erable auditory competence in identifying certain streams of over-
heard sound as communicative, parsing these streams into
significant, repeatable units despite wide speaker-to-speaker vari-
ation in actual sound patterns, distinguishing some of these
abstract unit-types as expressions of agreement or disagreement,
identifying adult communicative and referential intentions, and
so on. Children do, in fact, acquire these competencies during the
period when they are first learning language, also without much
by way of explicit instruction. (How much explicit instruction
could an infant receive without such capacities?) We might addi-
tionally posit a ‘‘theory of mind module” with a special ‘‘social ped-
agogy sub-module” to help explain this, but then engaging these
modules experientially likewise requires that the infant have
developed capacities to parse the stream of experience in
projectable ways, distinguishing continuing objects and imputing
similarities in patterns of motion and causal relations, and so
on—again, without extensive explicit instruction in these more
generic tasks. Perhaps elaborating modules is skirting the basic
problem.
What we can observe is that these competencies in language,
theory of mind, and causation are all developing during the same
period, and that progress in one seems to depend upon progress
in the others. We also have neuroimaging evidence that, in the
more fully-developed mind, the brain areas involved in these dif-
ferent forms of cognition overlap substantially, and seem to make
use of common, algorithm-like learning processes (Buckner,
Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008). And we have recently learned
that artificial systems built upon fairly generic learning algorithms
and memory structures, of kinds broadly similar to those found in
the human mind, are capable of tackling artificial intelligence tasks
previously thought to require extensive ‘‘purpose-built” engineer-
ing of features and heavy dependence upon already-developed
human expertise (Le et al., 2012; Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al.,
2016). While research in these areas is still young, still, the capac-
ity of such ‘‘deep learning” systems to solve open-ended arrays of
problems using a generic architecture, including the development
of novel value functions, causal hypotheses, and strategies, is a
glimpse of a ‘‘proof of possibility” for an enlarged understanding
of the contribution learning can make to the development and
structure of abstract representational systems like the human mind.
A common feature of these generic, but powerful, learning sys-
tems is that they operate by trying to generate their input—that is,
by finding and modeling general, projectable patterns in the input
on the basis of which to predict subsequent input, exploiting error-
based learning to ‘‘train” themselves without requiring extensive
explicit instruction. Are human infants like this? Although very
young human infants might not seem highly attentive the statistics
of the world around them, in the first days of life they can already
detect differences in rhythms between languages (Nazzi,
Bertoncini, & Mehler, 1998), and by 8 months their sensitivity to
conditional probabilities in overheard speech is sufficient to enable
them to segment fluent speech into words, and to focus attentionPlease cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
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Saffran, & Newport, 1998; Kidd, Piantadosi, & Aslin, 2012). Studies
of anticipatory looking suggest that infants have developed gener-
ative causal models by 8–9 months (Sobel & Kirkham, 2006, 2007),
and by 15 months they pay attention to sampling methods in mak-
ing these causal generalizations (Gweon, Tenenbaum, & Schulz,
2010). At 12 months, infant looking times at complex motion dis-
plays approximate the predictions of a Bayesian ‘‘ideal observer”
model, apparently using underlying abstraction-based inference
(Teglas et al., 2011), and by 16–18 months infants appear able to
use causal models inversely, inferring from ‘‘informal experiments”
the most likely hypothesis, and using this to ‘‘test” alternative cau-
sal pathways (Gopnik & Schulz, 2004)—e.g., using behavior to infer
underlying intentions, even when the action is unsuccessful
(Gweon & Schulz, 2011).
The habituation paradigm used in many of these experiments is,
in effect, a projection paradigm—indicating how infants actively
model incoming data to increase sensitivity to error. Drawing upon
two decades of studies, Gopnik and Wellman (2012; see also
Wellman, 2014) argue that Bayesian hierarchical causal learning
is sufficient to account for many aspects of the infant’s develop-
ment of a ‘‘theory of mind.” As we would expect from the generic
character of reinforcement learning and Bayesian probabilistic
inference, these capacities persist into adulthood and show up
across such domains as vision (Geisler, 2011), motor control (Liu
& Todorov, 2007), causal inference (Holyoak & Cheng, 2011), and
imputation of intention or detection of change using limited infor-
mation (Diaconescu et al., 2014; Gallistel, Liu, Krishan, Miller, &
Latham, 2014). The job of learning is never done, and expertise
can improve over decades (Yarrow, Brown, & Krakauer, 2009).
While this approximation of normatively appropriate proba-
bilistic learning, representation, and decision- and action-
guidance would appear to be contradicted by decades of research
on cognitive biases and heuristics (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman
& Tversky, 2000), that body of research is heavily based upon peo-
ple’s explicit responses to word problems in settings of conscious
judgment or choice, rather than settings in which implicit learning
with feedback takes place. For example, children’s implicit learning
in the well-known ‘‘false-belief” task, can run months or years
ahead of their ability to give accurate verbal responses to questions
addressed to them (Luo, 2011), and the acquired causal models
that guide a child’s motor behavior yield much more accurate
expectations than the ‘‘folk physics” children produce in response
to queries (Gelman & Legare, 2011). Even for adults, underlying
probabilistic models will contain many ‘‘hidden layers” of relations
among features, which can guide choice implicitly, yet cannot be
directly accessed introspectively (Kolling, Behrens, Mars, &
Rushworth, 2012). Interestingly, when a number of the classic
experiments from the heuristics and biases literature are redone
in a setting where implicit learning is possible and collateral impli-
cit statistical knowledge can be used, some of the well-known
anomalies don’t persist (see Friedman, 1998; Kolling et al., 2012;
Pleskac & Hertwig, 2014; Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002).
Humans are far from perfect in their reasoning, but the underlying
problem doesn’t seem to be an implicit or ‘‘intuitive” system that
wasn’t built for statistics, probabilistic inference, or abstract gener-
alization. What might be most important, in the end, is not how
much might or might not be contributed by a native endowment
or social conditioning—but rather how much flexibility and depth
of understanding in response to evidence and inference is possible.
That is, how much learning—wherever one starts.
3.4. Foraging for value
In optimal foraging behavior, animals behave ‘‘as if” they were
guided by evaluative assessments and rational choice theory,hy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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actions or policies on the basis of expected value. We have seen
that Tolman’s early observation that animals behave ‘‘as if” guided
by internal cognitive maps has received powerful support from
subsequent neuroscience, even if many questions remain unan-
swered (Moser et al., 2008). But what about the evaluative or
decision-theoretic ‘‘as if” story for observed optimal patterns in for-
aging behavior? Is there an ‘‘inner mapping” of the expected-value
landscape of choice, which is updated dynamically and actually
guides choice and behavior?
Two decades of study of the neural mechanisms underlying
reinforcement learning in monkeys and other foraging mammals
support a positive response. Behaviorists and neoclassical econo-
mists thought it was in principle impossible to factor choice behav-
ior into determinate evaluative vs. risk components, since all
reinforcement or selection takes place at the level of external
behavior rather than inner mechanisms. Yet as with spatial and
causal mapping, it seems to pay to have representational capacities
that can acquire the structure of the world, and magnitude of risk
vs. magnitude of reward correspond to importantly different struc-
tural features of the world. Single-neuron recordings indicate that
the mind of intelligent mammalian foragers does indeed keep sep-
arate track of risk vs. reward, and combines these as decision
weights in order to assess and compare the expected value of out-
comes, and to choose (Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schwartz, 2003;
Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011; Preuschoff, Bossaerts, & Quartz, 2006;
Tobler, O’Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 2006). These risk and reward
signals, moreover, exhibit many of the formal features of probabil-
ity and utility functions (Lak, Stauffer, & Schultz, 2014; Stauffer,
Lak, & Schultz, 2014), and the common pathways to action shared
by diverse kinds of risk and reward suggest that something like
cardinal utility comparisons guide choice (Quartz, 2007).
To be sure, the claim is not that these animals consciously fol-
low the principles of rational decision theory—that would require
not only the ability to represent decision weights, but to use
meta-representations of these weights in self-conscious delibera-
tion about how to act. Rather, like human kindergarteners whose
comprehension and speech fluently follow norms of grammar
and conversation, primates presumably think and act in accord
with norms of rational choice implicitly, via first-order representa-
tions and processing. While we do not have neuron-by-neuron evi-
dence for humans the way we do for primates, the brain structures
involved in primate decision-making have functional homologues
in humans, and observations of metabolic activity in the human
brain are consistent with underlying processing that has similar
algorithmic structure. Moreover, when humans are given simu-
lated foraging tasks their performance, like animal performance,
tends to approximate optimality (Behrens et al., 2007; Kolling
et al., 2012).4. Moral learning
4.1. Non-perspectival evaluative models
If moral learning in humans is to take place spontaneously, then
it should issue spontaneously in first-order evaluative representa-
tions that meet, or approximately meet, appropriate criteria for
moral assessment, such as those adumbrated in Section 1: (i)
impartiality, (ii) generality; (iii) consistency or coherence; (iv)
independence from authority or convention; and (vi) representing
benefits or harms to those affected in such a way as to be (v) non-
instrumentally thought- and action-guiding for the agent.
And if domain-general learning processes are truly to lie at the
heart of the development of moral understanding, then this should
not depend upon the triggering of an innate ‘‘moral module” orPlease cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
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tent meeting moral criteria should be acquired through experience
itself. In fact, recalling our earlier discussion of language learning, a
dose of moral learning might actually help solve the ‘‘application”
problem for nativist and socializing accounts, since a set of moral
rules cannot apply itself any more than a grammar can, and so
the infant must already have begun to develop discriminative abil-
ities to factor experience and behavior into such categories as
harm, benefit, risk, cooperation, and intention vs. accident. Other-
wise violations of moral norms will not be appropriately discerned,
and principles of helping others or punishing transgressors will not
be appropriately engaged. Yet this moral ‘‘pre-learning” already
involves organizing experience and regulating behavior in ways
that conform to (i)–(vi). For example, imitation has often been
invoked as an ‘‘automatic” path into moral development, but evi-
dence increasingly suggests that imitation is a flexible skill that
emerges along with other forms of perceptual, causal, and evalua-
tive learning (Williamson, Meltzoff, & Markham, 2008), and is itself
applied selectively by infants as a reflection of their experience of
the epistemic or moral qualities of potential models (Heyes, 2016;
Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010). These capacities for
implicit discrimination and choice along morally-relevant dimen-
sions appear to develop integrally with causal, conceptual, inten-
tional, and evaluative learning in general. As a result, maturing
individuals become increasingly able to give explicitly moral
expression to what they think and feel, and thus to participate
more fully in individual and shared moral deliberation.
We saw in the case of our foraging animal ancestors that natural
selection appears to have favored a spatial navigation system that
constructs non-perspectival as well as perspectival representations
of the physical environment. These representations are used
prospectively to locate the self with regard to the rest of the world,
to link proximate action with more distant goals, to compare alter-
nate paths of action, and thus to guide decision-making. Mental
mapping, in other words, appears to have evolved to represent
the abstract ‘‘impartial” geometry of space within which to embed
concrete individual locations and pathways. Such representations
constitute models of past experience but also serve as ‘‘test beds”
for projectively simulating the trajectories of oneself and others,
facilitating individual planning and social coordination and coop-
eration—even avoiding collisions as we walk or drive. Notably,
when engineers build autonomous robots and vehicles from
scratch, they find it efficient and effective to design them to model
spatial relations and simulate possible trajectories in similar ways
(Katrakazas, Quddus, Chen, & Deka, 2015). Is there evidence in the
case of humans—and perhaps other highly social animals as well—
of a similar fundamental capacity for non-perspectival as well as
perspectival evaluative ‘‘mapping” of social space and its possibil-
ities, which likewise models experience and subserves simulation
to enhance capacities for action, coordination, and cooperation—
including the avoidance of social collisions?
As a first step, we should note that prediction-error signals in
the brain track expectation violation not only for such ‘‘natural”
or concrete values as food and mating, but also for abstract values
like uncertainty, conventional values like money, and social values
like trustworthiness (Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008;
Fiorillo et al., 2003). Evaluative expectations come from an array of
sources within the affective system broadly understood, with the
result that the brain can respond to multiple kinds of values simul-
taneously (Lak et al., 2014). At the same time, pathways to action
collect together these multiple streams of evaluative information,
including uncertainty, to permit comparisons of expected value
and risk to guide decision-making—and set the stage for the next
round of error-based learning (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011;
Johnson, van der Meer, & Redish, 2007; Stauffer et al., 2014). This
appears to be a system with sufficient range and flexibility tohy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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with a learning capacity to promote fine-grained attunement of
attitude and behavior—indeed, this system appears to be shared
by moral and non-moral decision-making alike (Buckner et al.,
2008; Decety & Porges, 2011; Shenhav & Greene, 2010).
And there is no area where it is more important for the human
infant to develop fine-grained, well-attuned evaluative representa-
tions than the interpersonal, given an infant’s nearly complete
dependence on help from others and vital need to learn from them.
Grasping the dynamics of persons is central to interacting with
them reciprocally and successfully, and, here again, the world the
infant mind is striving to predict is more predictable if that mind
models things in ways that go beyond its own perspective. The
behavior of others, for example, is more projectable from their
mental states than one’s own, and social dynamics are more pro-
jectable if one takes into account general causal and structural
relations that are inherently non-perspectival. A representational
system adequate to the challenge of building generative causal
models will possess a capacity to correct for perspective or per-
sonal interests (i), to generalize across cases (ii), to treat like cases
alike (iii), to operate in some measure independently of received
opinion or authority relations (iv), and to regulate thought and
action accordingly (v). And if that model is to generate the behavior
of agents, it will also need to be able represent benefits and harms
to others as they experience them, not just as one would personally
benefit from seeing them (vi).
While these considerations are plausible, for the hypothesis of
moral learning to be credible, we need more direct evidence that
infants take a spontaneous interest in modeling and evaluating
agents’ intentions, actions, and outcomes from non-perspectival
as well as perspectival standpoints, and that such representations
are for them non-instrumentally thought- and action-guiding.
That infants pay close attention to normative aspects of third-
party behavior, and use this information to regulate their own con-
duct and choices in normatively-relevant ways, is perhaps most
readily seen in the epistemic case, e.g., learning whom to trust
about what. As we saw in discussing theory of mind, beginning
sometime in the first year and continuing progressively as greater
physical, cognitive, and social competence develops, infants use
contextual and social cues derived from third-person observation
to adjust their attention, learning, and behavior (Wellman, 2014).
By 12 months infants are able to distinguish reliably between ‘‘un-
able” and ‘‘unwilling” adult behavior (Woodward, Sommerville,
Gerson, Henderson, & Buresh, 2009). By 16 months, they show
heightened attention to mistaken labeling and labelers in learning
word use (Koenig & Echols, 2003), and by 36–48 months, children
are using observation of third-party adult behavior and its out-
comes to make discriminations of an adult’s accuracy, knowledge-
ability, competence, reliability, deceptiveness, and quality of will,
and to use these discriminations in deciding whether to trust the
adult in learning a new word, the location or identity of a hidden
object, the tastiness or healthiness of a novel food, or a counter-
evident fact (Doebel & Koenig, 2013; Lane, Harris, Gelman, &
Wellman, 2014; Nguyen, Gordon, Chevalier, & Girgis, 2016; Sobel
& Corriveau, 2010). An example of the non-perspectival aspect of
these epistemic evaluations is the fact that, with age, infants
become increasingly willing to rely upon information from an
unfamiliar individual who displays greater epistemic reliability
than a familiar caregiver (Harris & Corriveau, 2011). As they move
into their fourth year, children exhibit more fine-grained and well-
modulated epistemic sensitivities, for example paying increased
attention to the domain-relevance of imputed adult traits in mak-
ing decisions about what to learn from whom (Sobel & Corriveau,
2010). It is clear why non-perspectival evaluation of a third-
party’s capacities and motivations has special importance for the
child’s modeling of the social world. For example, even if aPlease cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
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pens to benefit the child at the moment, the fact that this adult
plays favorites remains important for the child to learn and take
into account, since favorites change.
Infants could hardly begin to learn at all if they did not start life
with ‘‘priors” that amount to default trust in their own sensory sys-
tem and memory—trust without evidence of reliability. After all,
without reliance upon sensation and memory, how could they
gather evidence to test reliability? Yet priors are neither destiny
nor blunt heuristics. With growing experience and perceptual
and cognitive development, infants become more discriminating
about when, and how much, to trust their eyes, ears, or memory.
For example, 3–6 year-olds with firmer grip upon the (abstract)
appearance/reality distinction show greater willingness to lend
some credence to the testimony of an informant who indicates
something contrary to what they took themselves to have (con-
cretely) seen (Lane et al., 2014).
Similarly, infants could hardly begin to have successful interac-
tion with, or learning from, adults if they did not start life with
‘‘priors” that amount to according adults some measure of default
trust. For example, during the first three years of life, infants tend
to require more evidence for a negative as opposed to positive trait
attribution to an adult (Bosevoski & Lee, 2006). Yet trust-based
expectations also drive feedback learning from the consequences
of relying upon a given adult, so that an infant’s causal/evaluative
social models become better attuned to the actual distribution of
trustworthiness in the adult world. For example, while infants
from early on appear to be especially wary of adults who show
signs of harmful behavior, by 8 months they can excuse adult
harmful behavior that takes the form of punishing an anti-social
individual (Hamlin, Wynn, Bloom, & Mahajan, 2011). And by the
fourth year, infants calibrate their own responses to adults to the
degrees of good will evidenced by an adult’s third-party interac-
tions (Bosevoski & Lee, 2006).
4.2. Empathic distress and empathic concern
Thus we have evidence that infants attend actively to
epistemically-relevant behavior among third parties, and use this
information to guide their own behavior. Such non-perspectival
mapping of the epistemic landscape, however, might be thought
to be a case where a clearly instrumental motive is at work—it typ-
ically pays to be mindful of who is trustworthy. Is there evidence of
intrinsic motivation to make and act on non-perspectival assess-
ments, as required by criterion (v)? And especially, is there evi-
dence that such motivation is responsive to morally-relevant
features of agents or actions, such as the pain or harm others suffer,
considered in its own right (vi)?
Studies of infants in the first year of life have found multiple
strands of evidence that very young infants seem intrinsically
motivated to detect agency in the world around them, attending
preferentially to movements that appear to be intentional even
in the absence of external incentive or reward. By 6–9 months
infants appear to infer agential goals from behavior, even for
‘‘agents” that are no more than moving shapes on a screen. They
spontaneously engage emotionally with such ‘‘agents,” reacting
not only to success or failure in goal pursuit, but also to the nature
of the imputed goal (for a review of infant intention attribution, see
Woodward et al., 2009; see Csibra, 2003 for an alternative interpre-
tation of such first-year cognition).
Arguably, there is instrumental advantage to attending to the
goals of the agents in one’s environment, and surely such informa-
tion has general epistemic and explanatory value. Consistent with
this, Kiley Hamlin and colleagues provide evidence that an infant’s
modeling of the intentional or narrative structure of third-party
interactions conforms to the predictions of Bayesian causalhy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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Ullman, Tenenbaum, Goodman, & Baker, 2013). At the same time,
however, throughout this period, infants also show a marked
preference for third parties whose behavior exhibits morally-
favored patterns (see Hamlin, 2013, for a summary, and a possible
nativist account of this ‘‘prior” in infant preferences). Infants as
young as 4–6 months follow with interest ‘‘morality plays”
involving googly-eyed geometric puppets, in which one puppet
seems to struggle to climb a hill while a second puppet intervenes
either to help or hinder its efforts. Infants with high reliability
exhibit favorable attitudes and preference for ‘‘pro-social”
individuals, and their grasp of the agential structure appears to
be strong enough by 8 months of age that they show a preference
for a puppet who hinders, rather than helps, a hinderer (Hamlin
et al., 2011).
The mechanisms underlying such early cognitive and affective
engagement with apparent benefits and harms to third-parties
are not known, but we do know that, by 9–10 months, infant
response to others’ distress is shifting from a focus on their own
distress to an orientation toward the distressed individual, and
showing signs of caring rather than being upset (Geangu, Benga,
Stahl, & Striano, 2011). And as infants’ capacity to model others
and to take action themselves grows through the second year
and beyond, they tend increasingly to attempt to console or help
someone in distress (Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & Zhan-Waxler, 2011).
We also know from neuroimaging studies of adults by Jean Dec-
ety and others that experiencing a mild shock, imaging oneself
receiving such a shock in the future, watching another receive such
a shock, and imagining another receiving this shock, activate sim-
ilar, though not entirely overlapping, elements of the affective sys-
tem (for recent reviews see Decety, Michalsha, & Kinzler, 2012 and
Bernhardt & Singer, 2012). In particular, empathic simulation of
another’s pain appears to focus primarily upon the aversiveness
of pain, rather than its sensory features (Bernhardt & Singer,
2012)—as such, it focuses the empathizing individual upon the
intrinsic disvalue of pain as such.
Debate continues over the nature of empathy, the role of cogni-
tive vs. affective components, and the importance of empathic dis-
tress (affective ‘‘resonance”) in response to the distress of others, as
opposed to empathic concernwith relieving their distress. However,
evidence suggests that, by 12–16 months, infants attempt to deci-
pher the cause of others’ distress, and engage spontaneously in
helping even in the absence of external reward or encouragement
(Warneken & Tomasello, 2006; Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow,
Wagner, & Chapman, 1992). If it were to turn out that all sponta-
neous empathic responses are, at the most fundamental level,
mediated by empathic distress, then empathic motivation would
be self-centered and instrumental, and fail to meet criteria (v)
and (vi) of moral appropriateness. Immanuel Kant’s well-known
rejection of the moral relevance of sympathy was based on a psy-
chological theory of this kind (1797/1996). For Hume, by contrast,
‘‘extensive sympathy” takes the other’s suffering as its direct
object. Evidence suggests (see Brown, Nesse, Vinokur, & Smith,
2003) that we experience satisfaction in relieving a stranger’s suf-
fering, but this does not show that the effort to relieve the pain was
itself instrumentally motivated. On the contrary, Hume argued,
such satisfaction depends upon the fact that we had relieving the
other’s suffering as our goal in the first place (1751/2000). Hence
for Hume, unlike Kant, empathic concern or sympathy can be the
cornerstone of moral motivation.
Careful investigation of the time-course of empathy in adults
indicates that a distress-like response to witnessing another’s pain
does indeed take place almost immediately, within the first 60–
400 ms after exposure. But in normal adults it is soon followed
(at 330–420 ms) by cognitive and affective responses associatedPlease cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
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Berthoz, 2014). Akin to other fast affective responses such as fear,
empathic distress might serve as an ‘‘alarm signal” that something
needs attending to, priming the mind and body to reorient (Blair,
2007). But typically, the other, rather than the self, is the object
of this reorientation—just as fear typically reorients the individual
toward the source of the threat, rather than toward her own inter-
nal state.
Interestingly, there seems to be a range of variation across indi-
viduals in the extent to which empathic concern predominates
over empathic distress, and their evaluative attitudes or attribu-
tions of responsibility can mediate this process (Decety, Echols, &
Correll, 2010). Such differences in individual responsiveness may
help explain why hypothetical moral scenarios seldom receive
unanimous verdicts. For example, experimental subjects with a
more pronounced disposition to experience empathic distress (as
opposed to empathic concern) were found to be more likely to
exhibit emotional distancing and to withdraw rather than assist
when costly help is needed (FeldmanHall, Dalgleish, Evans, &
Mobbs, 2015; Paciello, Fida, Cerniglia, Tramontano, & Cole, 2013).
The notorious ‘‘trolley problems” we will consider below involve
the prospect of very costly interventions—killing an innocent
human being—when one could simply walk away. Great attention
has been focused on asymmetries in willingness to intervene
across different versions of the trolley problem, but one point is
often lost sight of: Why would individuals express willingness to
intervene in any such cases—why take on such a serious offense
to save a group of strangers, given that one could reduce distress
in such situations simply via distancing and rationalization? Yet
cross-culturally, in hypothetical cases, virtual simulations, and
monetized versions involving real effects upon assistance to actual,
needy children, a significant majority of people are willing to inter-
vene in a variety of trolley cases (Gold, Colman, & Pulford, 2014;
Navarrette et al., 2012; though see also Gold, Pulford, & Colman,
2014). It seems difficult to explain this robust pattern in behavior
without positing a widely-distributed tendency to accord intrinsic
weight to the fate of strangers.
If a Humean account is right, then we should expect that those
deficient in the ability to simulate accurately the affective states of
others would tend exhibit a range of difficulties or dysfunctions in
their social conduct and personal lives. Diminished ability to sim-
ulate affectively ‘‘what it is like” for others, or ‘‘what it would be
like” for others or for one’s own future self were one to take certain
actions, leaves one at a systematic disadvantage in successful nav-
igation of the human landscape. Blair (2006, 2007) has used behav-
ioral, neuroimaging, and clinical evidence to argue that something
like this may be the case for individuals on the psychopathy spec-
trum, who show specific deficits in processing aversive affective
information in reinforcement learning. In consequence such indi-
viduals fail to learn from past negative experience to accurately
project future harms, and thus lose an important source of guid-
ance in avoiding behaviors harmful to themselves as well as others.
More than we now realize, psychopathy might be a learning
disorder.
Relatedly, we should expect that damage to brain regions or cir-
cuits involved in the affective component of simulating perspec-
tives other than one’s own current point of view, would tend to
undermine both moral and prudential learning and behavior. Ven-
tromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and frontopolar cortex (FPC)
appear to play a key role in affective simulation and evaluation,
and early damage to these regions can cause serious impairments
in moral learning, while frontopolar dementia can sharply reduce
moral sensitivity, social inhibition, and prudential restraint, even
without change in the content of normative beliefs (Baez et al.,
2014; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005).hy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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One impressive sign that neuro-typical children actively con-
struct non-perspectival evaluative models in the social domain,
and can be intrinsically motivated thereby, is the evidence that
infants normally acquire tacit mastery of the distinction between
a moral transgression and the violation of a social rule in the first
3–4 years of life, and treat the former as more serious (Smetana,
1989). Such moral learning appears to be spontaneous—it is found
across an array of cultures (Turiel, 2002), and it seems unlikely that
most parents will have explicitly reinforced their children for rec-
ognizing a distinction between what morality requires and what is
required by the adults in authority. Evidence also indicates that
children at this age place moral violations in a separate category
from questions of personal taste and ‘‘pragmatic” norms of conve-
nience, and treat moral concerns as less optional and more serious
(Dahl & Kim, 2014).
Moreover, children not only make these discriminations, but
they tend to use the same criteria for distinguishing the moral from
other norms, and for explaining its relative importance for action.
For example, in line with the criteria we have used here, preschool-
ers see moral requirements as authority- and convention-
independent, general in scope, concerned with harm or benefit to
others, and more serious to violate (Turiel, 2002). This discrimina-
tive competence is manifest motivationally as well, since children
at this age will resist taking actions that inflict harm upon others
simply in virtue of a new rule imposed by an authority figure.
And they appear to be intrinsically motivated to enforce moral
norms in ways they are not motivated to enforce demands of con-
ventional authority, and will spontaneously console victims of
moral transgressions even when the victims themselves do not
show physical distress (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009;
Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011).
As a sophisticated implicit ‘‘model” of the moral, this compe-
tency can be used to innovate as well. Some children, starting
around age 6, become ‘‘independent vegetarians”—resisting eating
meat even though this has been the norm in their family and social
context (Hussar & Harris, 2009). More so than children who grow
up in vegetarian families, ‘‘independent vegetarians” cite reducing
the suffering of animals as the ground for refraining from eating
meat. Thus, these children seem capable of appreciating, and being
intrinsically motivated to act upon, morally-important concerns
grounded in the interests of those wholly outside their own ‘‘in-g
roup”—and in the face of life-long evidence that ‘‘people like me”
(e.g., members of one’s own family) do not act this way.
Such a spontaneous willingness to take into account the suffer-
ing of strangers—even members other species—at some expense to
the self might seem incompatible with an evolution of the human
psyche based upon genetic relatedness and small social groups. A
significant body of psychological evidence does attest to the ten-
dencies of humans, from early months onward, to favor those per-
ceived as similar to themselves (see for example Hamlin, Mahajan,
et al., 2013; Hamlin, Ullman, et al., 2013). However, various
behavioral studies have also found that generosity or cooperation
in one-off interactions with strangers is the default response of
most individuals, while self-interested behavior emerges only with
second and third thoughts (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012). In a
carefully-run experiment in using actual money and actual (small
but real) shocks, Molly Crockett and colleagues found that adults
on the whole were willing to pay a higher price to prevent a shock
to a stranger than to themselves (Crockett, Kurth-Nelson, Siegel,
Dayan, & Dolan, 2014). And Ernst Fehr and colleagues, also using
real money, have found that people were willing to pay to punish
someone who was being unfair at the expense of a third party
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). At the neural level, fMRI imaging has
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subjects, achieving cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma games
induces greater reward activity than even self-advantageous non-
cooperative outcomes (Rilling et al., 2002).
Why might this be? The ethnographic record indicates that
many hunter-gatherer bands practice exogamy (i.e., marriage takes
place with individuals outside the group), and field observations
suggest that individuals not infrequently shift from one band to
another, whether as an outcome of warfare, social exclusion,
migration, decay of group size, or attempts to secure better pro-
spects (Marlowe, 2003). Hunter-gatherer social and trading net-
works can be extensive, and ‘‘functional social proximity”
through shared activity or exchange is often more influential than
actual ‘‘kin proximity” in shaping behavior (Apicella et al., 2012).
Engaging effectively in these more flexible and less directly
group-centric ways of life puts a premium on the ability to ‘‘size
up” and interact with strangers and other groups in light of assess-
ments of general, modal, morally-relevant characteristics such as
cooperativeness, trustworthiness, competence, knowledgeability,
aggressiveness, or tendencies to help or share. Group selection
and sexual selection likewise involve such traits, and have been
identified as processes that can favor the emergence of signifi-
cantly altruistic behavior that cuts across genetic relatedness
(Nesse, 2007).
4.4. Explicit and implicit bias
Still, an inevitable problem for such a learning-based architec-
ture is that it will function only as well at providing an objective
representation of social reality as the experiential ‘‘sample” to
which it is exposed is itself broadly representative of that reality.
And unfortunately, human social experience tends to be unrepre-
sentative in many ways—one is born into a particular family in a
particular society, and into a particular social and cultural location
within society, skewing the sample from which one learns from
early on. This appeal to skewed learning to explain bias is distinct
from explanations involving purportedly atavistic ‘‘us/them” or
‘‘tribal” attitudes. In this light, it is notable that implicit bias does
not appear to be fully established until approximately the age of
six (Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008). That is, even though younger
children tend to be essentializing (Gelman, 2009), and to favor
those perceived as like themselves (Hamlin, Mahajan, et al.,
2013; Hamlin, Ullman, et al., 2013), they appear to need to learn
which social groups have which ‘‘essential” features, who in the
wide world is alike with or different from themselves, and what
the social hierarchy is. Unlike an ‘‘us/them” bias, moreover, impli-
cit bias tends to favor those of higher social standing, and thus
often does not favor one’s group if one belongs to a stigmatized
subpopulation. Further, dominant-culture negative stereotypes of
a marginalized group are often found in those belonging to this
group (Dunham et al., 2008). It would seem that children living
in the same society tend to learn similar implicit casual/evaluative
models of that society, reflective of the underlying social hierarchy
and power relations, even if these children also differ in a host of
other group-related attitudes.
If much social prejudice is learned in these ways, then it should
in principle be possible to unlearn it by changing people’s experien-
tial sample. Perhaps the most relevant literature here is research
on effective ways of overcoming implicit bias. An extensive review
of this literature supports the hypothesis that the most effective
ways of overcoming such bias involve ‘‘contact” processes that go
beyond mere exposure of groups to one another, and include activ-
ities in which individuals from different groups co-participate in
activities that have a common goal, draw upon the contributions
of each, and involve taking the perspective of others (Blair, 2002;
Dasgupta & Rivera, 2008; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp,hy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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more extensive and representative feedback seems to be the most
reliable way to reduce implicit bias—and can have this effect even
in those individuals who continue to express explicit prejudice.
A historic ‘‘natural experiment” illustrates this on the social
scale. Explicit and implicit bias against homosexuals and homosex-
ual relations has been strong across a wide array of societies and
religious traditions for centuries, and some psychologists had sug-
gested that such bias arises from ‘‘automatic” disgust reactions
rooted in natural selection. Yet disgust and related ‘‘basic” mecha-
nisms like gustatory taste appear to be considerably more complex
and construal-dependent than ‘‘automatic” accounts would sug-
gest (Tybur, Kursban, Lieberman, & DeScioli, 2013). And ‘‘core dis-
gust” may have less role in moral judgment than previously
thought (Landy & Goodwin, 2015; Yu et al., 2013). In recent dec-
ades, gay individuals’ greater openness about their sexual orienta-
tion—which began a great personal expense in the face of strong
social sanctions—has meant that the heterosexual population is
now aware that it is engaged in meaningful, shared activity with
gay individuals in virtually every area of life. In consequence, atti-
tudes toward questions like gay marriage, and measures of implicit
bias toward gays, have undergone a dramatic change—especially
among the young, who have lived their entire lives in an atmo-
sphere of more open recognition of sexual orientation (Westgate,
Riskind, & Nosek, 2015). That a centuries-old form of prejudice—
an ‘‘us” vs. ‘‘them” bias thought to be deeply rooted in our psy-
ches—could undergo such rapid change is a tribute to the power
of learning, even from ‘‘old” evidence that has been re-
categorized, if given a chance.
Here we have largely emphasized implicit and individual learn-
ing processes, but not because social and self-consciously reflective
processes are unimportant in moral learning—on the contrary,
humans are social, discursive, ratiocinating beings, and human
moral thought and practice profoundly reflect this. Rather, our
focus arises from the need to contrast a moral learning approach
as clearly as possible with ‘‘hard-wired” or nativist accounts, on
the one hand, or external ‘‘socialization” into morality, on the
other. Innate modules and external socialization could well play
a role in moral learning, but, we have argued, their operation
may presuppose children’s fundamental abilities to be attentive
to, discriminating about, and internally motivated by, morally-
relevant features of the world—and implicitly competent at distin-
guishing these from matters of authority, convention, taste, or
convenience.5. Some applications of a moral learning perspective
5.1. The nature of intuition and intuitions
Our challenge has been to develop a picture of how individuals
can acquire through experience evaluative models of situations,
agents, actions, and practices that meet such moral criteria as
impartiality, generality, authority-independence, a non-
instrumental concern with benefits and harms to those affected,
and thought- and action-guidingness. These evaluative models
are not assumed to belong to a dedicated ‘‘moral faculty,” but
rather to be components of the more comprehensive causal/evalu-
ative models we form of the world.
As currently understood, such mental models take the form of
many-layered neural networks with large numbers of parameters,
constantly engaged in the projection of novel expectations and
subsequent updating of the model’s parameters via the ‘‘back-
propagation” of any discrepancies with actual outcomes. Neural
networks embody a hierarchy of abstraction and generality, and
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language, and thought. Much, perhaps most, of the evaluative
assessment they furnish is thus likely to be ‘‘intuitive”—in essen-
tially the same way that native speakers’ judgments of whether a
sentence is ‘‘grammatical” or ‘‘odd” are largely ‘‘intuitive”—even
though they may carry highly nuanced information about an
underlying model of syntactic regularities or semantic features.
Intuition in this sense is a summative or holistic conscious
‘‘mode of presentation” of the outputs of a complex underlying
model. It appears to operate across such diverse domains as per-
ceptual image recognition, athletic or game-playing skill, artisanal
or professional expertise, artistic creativity, and ‘‘social intelli-
gence”—in all of these domains, a given interpretation, situation,
or action may ‘‘feel” right or wrong, ‘‘look” shaky, ‘‘sound” promis-
ing, or ‘‘seem” urgent. Similarly, recent research suggests that the
insula receives many streams of input from different systems of
the body and mind, as well as sensory information about the exter-
nal environment, and yields a summative ‘‘intuitive” sense of one’s
mental or physical condition, or of how well one’s life is going
(Craig, 2009). Even though intuitions are typically experienced as
spontaneous and non-deliberative, they in fact can represent the
output of on-going, information-intensive, high-dimensional cal-
culations of brain networks capable of millions of neural firings
per second. In all these examples, intuitions are not ‘‘automatic,”
inflexible, ‘‘preset,” stimulus-driven, or ‘‘informationally-encapsul
ated” responses. Moreover, given their deep experiential base, such
intuitions can also resist conscious cognitive pressure or rational-
ization—even after one has constructed a plausible-sounding ratio-
nale, an action might still feel wrong, though we cannot say why.
Intuition in this sense is also not confined to momentary expe-
riences. An entire suite of thought and action—a fluent conversa-
tion, a gracious social response to an awkward situation, a novel
musical improvisation—can be guided ‘‘intuitively,” without con-
scious reflection. Such intuitive action-guidance is made possible
via implicit model-based control, which draws upon the generative
character of the underlying causal/evaluative models and their
capacity to update in response to experience in real time.
If people are largely similar in their basic psychology and typi-
cal hopes and fears, and if life presents us with similar problems
and opportunities, then learning might account for the fact that
people tend to have broadly similar intuitions in a number of core
areas in morality: the need to limit personal aggression or defend
oneself against it, to build mutual trust and willing cooperation, to
stabilize possessions while facilitating beneficial exchanges, to
share jointly-created or scarce resources, and to provide for the
young and vulnerable (Brown, 2004; Henrich et al., 2004; Rai &
Fiske, 2011).
5.2. Dual-process accounts of moral judgment: first generation
This ‘‘deep learning” picture of intuition offers a different
approach to the nature and potential normative authority of moral
intuition from predominant contemporary ‘‘dual-process”
accounts of morality. Let’s explore this contrast in two stages, look-
ing first at the original dual-process accounts (Greene & Haidt,
2002; Haidt, 2001), and then considering a ‘‘second generation”
of dual-process accounts that has emerged only recently
(Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013). As our main case study, we will
discuss how these different accounts tackle the well-known ‘‘trol-
ley problems,” which afford the best-studied (some would say,
most over-studied) examples of moral judgment in the literature.
On predominant dual-process accounts, moral intuitions are
attributed to the action of ‘‘System 1,” an ‘‘evolutionarily ancient”
affective system we inherit from our animal ancestors. While
different characterizations are used by different authors,
System 1 is typically described as fast, ‘‘automatic,” ‘‘emotional,”hy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
1 We should keep in mind, of course, that the same pattern is not shown by all
subjects—there are non-trivial variations that also need explaining, as we will discuss
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‘‘little understanding of logic or statistics” or upon ‘‘gut feelings,”
‘‘push buttons,” or ‘‘presets” (Greene, 2013; Greene & Haidt,
2002; Greene et al., 2009; Haidt, 2007; Kahneman, 2011; Prinz,
2004). The automatic responses of System 1 are hypothesized to
have evolved because they are of a kind generally useful in the
environments in which most adaptation of humans and their
ancestors occurred, and because they require little representa-
tional or computational complexity to operate in the brain. Neural
simplicity makes for speed, but at the cost of flexibility, and as a
result System 1 intuitions may be inappropriate in unusual circum-
stances or in some modern social settings. Evolutionarily newer
‘‘System 2,” by contrast, is seen as the system of reflective thought
and decision-making. It is slower, ‘‘cognitive,” ‘‘domain-general,”
and calculative—capable of delivering reasoned judgments based
upon logical and statistical inference, but also capable of after-
the-fact rationalizations or ‘‘confabulation” when System 1 issues
in responses before System 2 can come into play (Haidt, 2001).
A well-known example used to illustrate this contrast between
intuitive and reasoned judgment is Jonathan Haidt’s case of Julie &
Mark:
Julie & Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in
France on summer vacation from college. One night they are stay-
ing alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be
interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least it
would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already tak-
ing birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe.
They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again.
They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel
even closer to each other. What do you think about that? Was
OK for them to make love?
[Haidt, 2001]
Haidt reports that a majority of his subjects say that this was
not ‘‘OK,” though when pressed for reasons they often provide
rationales that do not, it seems, apply in this case—that incest leads
to birth defects, psychological and familial trauma, and so on. Fur-
ther pressed, subjects may insist upon their original negative judg-
ment even while admitting they can offer no convincing rationale
for it, a phenomenon Haidt and colleagues call ‘‘moral dumbfound-
ing” (Haidt, 2001).
Haidt offers an evolutionary explanation: for early humans liv-
ing in small groups, incest was indeed a serious risk to reproduc-
tive fitness, and so an automatic disgust response evolved to
make the prospect of incestuous relations aversive (Haidt, 2001).
This System 1 ‘‘flash” of disgust is insensitive to further informa-
tion, so Julie and Mark’s action continues to ‘‘just seem wrong,”
despite the favorable outcome.
The dual-process approach challenged a number of long-
standing assumptions about the role of reason vs. emotion in moral
judgments. Of special importance was the neuroimaging work of
Joshua Greene and colleagues (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom,
Darley, & Cohen, 2001), who studied brain responses to contem-
plating hypothetical moral dilemmas, most notably, ‘‘trolley prob-
lems.” Trolley problems were first introduced into the
philosophical literature by Foot (1967/1978) and Thomson
(1976), and are now widely used in psychological testing of moral
judgment as well. They owe their influence to a striking asymme-
try shown in typical intuitive moral judgments regarding two
canonical scenarios with seemingly similar net outcomes, which
we will call Switch and Footbridge.
Switch. A runaway trolley is speeding down the track, its driver
slumped over the controls, apparently unconscious. Ahead on the
tracks are five workers, who do not see the trolley coming, and
who soon will be struck and killed. You are standing next to a leverPlease cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
cognition.2016.08.015that operates a switch lying between the trolley and the workers.
Pushing this lever would send the trolley onto a sidetrack. That
would save the five workers, but there is a single worker on the
sidetrack, who will be struck and killed. Should you push the lever
to send the trolley down the sidetrack?
In a typical sample, a strong majority will say yes, and give as
their reason the need to minimize the loss of life in such emergen-
cies. But now consider:
Footbridge. A runaway trolley is speeding down the track, its dri-
ver slumped over the controls, apparently unconscious. Ahead on
the tracks are five workers, who do not see the trolley coming,
and who soon will be struck and killed. You are standing on a foot-
bridge over the track, next to a very large man. This man’s weight is
sufficient to stop the trolley, though your own is not. If he were to
fall into the path of the trolley, that would bring it to a halt before
hitting the five workers, saving their lives but killing him. Should
you push the man off the footbridge into the path of the trolley?
This time, in a typical sample, a strong majority will say no.
When queried, people often explain this verdict in terms of the
impermissibility of deliberately using a person in this way, rather
than merely harming a person as an unavoidable side-effect, as
in Switch.
So, the next scenario to consider is:
Loop. A runaway trolley is speeding down the track, its driver
slumped over the controls, apparently unconscious. Ahead on the
tracks are five workers, who do not see the trolley coming, and
who soon will be struck and killed. You are standing next to a lever
that operates a switch lying between the trolley and the workers,
and pushing the lever would send the trolley onto a side loop. This
loop rejoins the main track just before the location of the workers.
However, on that loop stands a single large worker, who would be
struck and killed if you switched the trolley. His weight would bring
the trolley to a halt before the loop rejoins the main track, saving
the five workers. Should you push the lever to send the trolley onto
the side loop?
In Loop, the man on the side-track, like the man on the foot-
bridge, is deliberately used as a means to stop the trolley. Yet a
strong majority will give the same answer to Loop as Switch—
yes, one should push the lever to send the trolley down the
sidetrack.
Now, when asked to explain why their verdicts differ in Loop
and Footbridge, most cannot articulate a clear rationale. Despite
this, for the majority, the intuitive verdicts in all three cases remain
fairly strong, and the asymmetry between Switch and Loop, on the
one hand, and Footbridge, on the other, persists. This, then, appears
to be another case of ‘‘moral dumbfounding.”
What does explain this resilient pattern of intuitive judg-
ments?1 Some philosophers offer a normative response in terms of
more complex underlying moral principles (e.g., Kamm, 2007), but
the neuroimaging results of Greene and colleagues suggested that
looking for ever more intricate principles was looking in the wrong
place (Greene et al., 2001). They had found that contemplating
Footbridge-like scenarios excited relatively greater activation in
brain areas linked to emotional responses, while contemplating sce-
narios involving more indirect ways of bringing harm to the victim,
as in Switch or Loop, excited relatively greater activation in areas
concerned with working memory and controlled cognition. This sug-
gested that the asymmetry was attributable to dual-processing. In
Footbridge, a fast, strong, negative, ‘‘emotional” System 1 responsebriefly below.
hy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
P. Railton / Cognition xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 11to the ‘‘personal” harm of pushing the man to his death pre-empts or
preponderates over a slower, weaker, favorable, ‘‘rational” System 2
response to saving the five workers’ lives. In Switch and Loop, by
contrast, the more ‘‘impersonal” character of the harm done to the
lone victim means that no strong emotional response is triggered
in System 1, and so System 2’s reasoned, harm-minimizing response
preponderates.2 Greene and colleagues subsequently made this
interpretation more precise through a series of experiments that
strongly suggested that it is the direct use of one’s own muscular
force in Footbridge, rather than ‘‘personal” harming as such, that is
driving the asymmetry—a parameter that seemed even more likely
to reflect an ‘‘automatic” emotional response rather than a credible
underlying moral principle (Greene et al., 2009). Other experiments
showed that increasing cognitive load selectively diminishes cost-
benefit-oriented judgment in trolley problems, while cognitive prim-
ing and interfering with visualization increases it (Amit & Greene,
2012; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). In a
recent formulation, Greene attributes the System 1 response in Foot-
bridge to an emotional ‘‘alarm” in an evolved ‘‘myopic module” that
cannot see ahead to the greater number of lives that would be saved
by pushing the man (Greene, 2013). In Switch and Loop, by contrast,
harm is done without direct exertion of muscular force on the victim,
and so does not trigger the same ‘‘myopic” System 1 response as
Footbridge.
However, as we have seen in previous sections, an impressive
body of evidence in neuroscience and behavioral psychology sug-
gests that the affect and reward system we inherit from our forag-
ing ancestors does not resemble these characterizations of System
1—instead, it seems designed to learn complex statistical relation-
ships, subserving the building of abstract casual/evaluative models
that guide attention, perception, and action along expected-value
maximizing lines. Indeed, the long-standing idea of dividing the
brain and mind into ‘‘rational” and ‘‘emotional” regions or func-
tions is losing currency, since the two are increasingly being found
to be inextricably intertwined—one of the key claims of Hume’s
Treatise (1738/1978). Reasoning makes heavy use of the affective
system in forming the decision weights that guide deliberation
and choice, and affective responses evolve dynamically in response
to cognitive construal and appraisal (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009;
Pessoa, 2008).
Moral emotion and judgment in particular appear to be
grounded in large-scale, functionally-integrated, domain-general
brain networks that recruit information widely and overlap exten-
sively with such functions as episodic and semantic memory, the-
ory of mind, hypothetical mental ‘‘construction” and simulation,
and planning (Buckner et al., 2008; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009;
Moll & Oliveira-Souza, 2007; Moll, Zahn, Oliveira-Souza, Krueger,
& Grafman, 2005; Shenhav & Greene, 2010). As the evidence
stands, there seems to be nothing like a domain-specific ‘‘moral
module” or set of moral ‘‘push buttons.”5.3. Dual-process accounts of moral judgment: second generation
However, there has recently emerged a new dual-process
approach to the asymmetry between Footbridge and Switch that
does not depend upon problematic assumptions about ‘‘reason”
vs. ‘‘emotion.” Moreover, it focuses precisely on the role of learning
in moral psychology.
In the past two decades, learning theorists have delineated a
distinction between ‘‘model-free” and ‘‘model-based” reinforce-2 In the literature, resistance to pushing in Footbridge is called a ‘‘deontological”
judgment (since it seems to exclude mere cost/benefit calculation), while pushing the
man is called ‘‘utilitarian” (since it seems to rely exclusively upon cost/benefit
calculation). However, these are not entirely happy labels, for reasons that will be
discussed below, so I will avoid them here.
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of behavioral phenomena (Daw & Doya, 2006; Sutton & Barto,
1999). Recently, Molly Crockett, Fiery Cushman, and others have
shown how this distinction can be used to account for otherwise
puzzling patterns in moral judgment, including trolley problems
(Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013).
Thus far, we have largely focused on model-based learning and
control—how do model-free learning and control differ? In model-
free learning, prediction-error learning is used, not to build causal/
evaluative models that generate and evaluate multiple options
during choice, but to develop ‘‘cached” expectation values for indi-
vidual actions, or, more properly, for hsituation, actioni pairs. This
is done by telescoping into a single expectation value assigned to
an action in a situation action all the estimated reward information
about future value paths that could issue from that action. In
model-free control, a simple comparison of cached value estimates
makes it possible to select the action of those available with the
higher expected value, without needing to ‘‘look ahead” to future
consequences and calculate back to the alternative choices—that
information is already ‘‘contained” in the cached expected value.
In an environment with stable choices and rewards, model-free
control that has been fully trained up can achieve optimal choice
with fewer on-line computational demands than model-based con-
trol (Le et al., 2012). Thus, in such a static environment, control will
tend to shift from model-based to model-free control as an animal
becomes ‘‘overtrained.” However, if the available actions or reward
values subsequently change, then, although the cached values for
hsituation, actioni pairs will no longer be accurate, the ‘‘over-
trained” animal will initially continue to follow these cached val-
ues and choose sub-optimally, since learning new model-free
values requires gradual retraining. In model-based control, by con-
trast, new information can enter directly into the model, allowing
an animal to adapt rapidly even to large changes in the environ-
ment or reward values.
The classic demonstration of model-free vs. model-based
control of behavior is thus ‘‘devaluation,” in which a previously-
valued stimulus is experimentally devalued, yet the behavior
continues as before (Dickinson, Balleine, Watt, Gonzalez, &
Boakes, 1995). For example, since I always flip the light switch
when starting down the cellar stairs, and have always been
rewarded by being able to see where I’m going, I have acquired a
cached positive expected value for hstarting down the cellar stairs,
flip the light switchi. This saves me mentally projecting possible
future outcomes of a decision that always yields the same,
favorable result. However, this also means that, even if I am head-
ing down into the cellar for the express purpose of replacing the
burned-out lightbulb, I will still flip the switch as I start down
the stairs. My overall casual/evaluative model of the situation,
which includes the recently burned-out bulb, the devaluation of
flipping the switch in the current circumstance, the disvalue of
being unable to see my way in the cellar, and the existence in
the cupboard of a supply of replacement bulbs, enables me to
imaginatively project and positively evaluate the action sequence
of stopping by the cupboard, picking up a replacement bulb, and
heading down into the cellar without flipping the switch—a suite
of behaviors I might never before have performed. Yet this
model-based plan doesn’t stop the stimulus of starting down the
stairs from triggering the cached model-free reward value of
flipping the switch—so I do so, pointlessly.
Model-based and model-free learning and control thus can
operate in tandem, giving us a new way of conceiving dual-
processing: two potentially ‘‘rational” forms of learning and con-
trol are shaping my behavior, and the impact of the proximate
stimulus of starting down the cellar stairs can trigger a well-
established cached hsituation, actioni value for flipping the switch
even though my more comprehensive model has devalued this act.hy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
3 Percentages may fail to add to 100%, because students may accidentally push a
button that does not correspond to a valid answer. In the text I will give student
percentages from the most recent time the course was taught. There has been no
notable variation in the pattern of student responses from year to year, even though
in some cases the course was taught for first- and second-year students with no
background in philosophy, while in other cases it has been taught for upper-level
students who have already taken some philosophy. The wording of the questions has
changed somewhat from year to year, without notable effect on student voting.
Students were told, truthfully, that they would receive 1 point for every class session
in which they entered a response to at least one question, but that individual
responses would never be consulted. Normally, sampling lasted about 10–30 s after
the question was posed, at which time the result of the polling was displayed as a bar
graph for all to see. The fact that several scenarios or questions might be posed in the
same class session might have had the effect of implicitly encouraging students to
seek to give more ‘‘consistent” responses, though they were given no instruction
concerning which cases were most similar to one another in moral terms. Approx-
imately one-quarter of the students on a given day were women.
12 P. Railton / Cognition xxx (2016) xxx–xxxFor obvious reasons, model-free processing is associated with
habitual, stimulus-response behavior, and model-based processing
with goal-directed, flexible, and adaptive action.
Cushman (2013) has suggested that the intuitive rejection of
pushing the large man off the footbridge might be an instance of
model-free learning and control at work. For example, my personal
history of direct experience and indirect observation of the dis-
value of violently shoving someone in situations other than self-
defense leaves me with a cached, strongly negative value for acts
of this kind. The stimulus of imaginatively contemplating pushing
the man off the bridge triggers this cached disvalue, which is not
sensitive to the highly unusual ‘‘revaluation” that connects this
act to the saving of five workers’ lives. Model-free processing
(think of this as System 1) thus results in a powerful ‘‘intuitive”
sense that I should not push, which does not simply yield in the
face of the more abstract cost-benefit analysis issuing from my
overall causal/evaluative model of the situation (think of this as
System 2). In Switch and Loop, by contrast, since I do not have a
similar history of direct or indirect negative experience with push-
ing levers that activate a switch, no cached model-free negative
value is triggered by the imagined stimulus of addressing myself
to the lever, so there is no similar competition with model-based
control that looks ahead to the positive remoter consequences of
pulling the lever.
Cushman’s (2013) account thus offers a compelling explanation
of the trolley asymmetries that is grounded in current thinking
about learning and control. It also coheres well with much of the
collateral evidence for the original dual-processing account, e.g.,
concerning the effects of cognitive load, cognitive priming, disrupt-
ing visualization, and varying degrees of directness in exerting
muscular force upon the victim (see Amit & Greene, 2012;
Greene et al., 2008, 2009). And Cushman adds to this a new body
of data indicating that people are averse to performing actions that
superficially resemble normally harmful actions, even when it is
clear that no harm is actually involved—e.g., hammering a person’s
trouser leg when it is known to contain only a plastic pipe or pull-
ing the trigger of heavy fake gun pointed at the experimenter’s face
(Cushman, Gray, Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012).
5.4. Model-based trolleyology
The model-free/model-based dual-process explanation of trol-
ley asymmetries is highly promising. However, this approach does
make the persistence and force of these asymmetries a bit puz-
zling. Model-free values are slow to respond to revaluations, but
they do respond. If I can’t find a replacement bulb for the cellar
light, so that it remains non-functional for several weeks, then a
number of frustrated attempts will eventually lead me to lose
the habit of flipping the switch as I go down the steps, and perhaps
acquire the habit of picking up a flashlight before heading to the
cellar. Philosophers and psychologists who have been contemplat-
ing trolley problems for years, even running various kinds of sim-
ulations, still seem to share the sense that pushing in Footbridge is
markedly more problematic morally than pulling the lever in
Switch or Loop, even as they struggle to explain why.
A model-based explanation of the asymmetries, if grounded in
robust causal/evaluative features that differentiate the cases, could
account for such persistence. We already have seen reasons for
thinking that underlying causal/evaluative models can manifest
themselves in immediate ‘‘intuitions” as well as more deliberative
judgments. And since we typically lack direct insight into the
deeply-layered underlying models, even robustly-based distinc-
tions may be difficult to fathom based upon surface features. To
test these ideas, we need to fill out our sample of cases in a way
that is not customary in the trolley-problem literature. Consider
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with X:
Bus. You are visiting a city where there have recently been terrorist
suicide bombings. The terrorists target crowded buses or subway
cars. To prevent anyone stopping them, they run up at the last
moment when the bus or subway doors are closing, triggering their
bomb as they enter. You are on a crowded bus at rush hour, just
getting off at your stop. Next to you a large man is also getting
off, and the doors are about to close behind the two of you. You spot
a man with an overcoat rushing at the doors, aiming to enter just
behind the exiting man. Under his coat you see bombs strapped to
his chest, and his finger is on a trigger. If you were to push the large
man hard in the direction of the approaching man, they both would
fall onto the sidewalk, where the bomb would explode, killing both.
You would have fallen back onto the bus, and the closing doors
would protect you and the other occupants of the bus from the
bomb. Alternatively, you could continue exiting the bus, and you
and the large man would be on sidewalk, protected by the closing
doors, as the bomb goes off inside the bus, killing the terrorist and
five passengers. Either way, then, you will not be hurt. Should you
push the large man onto the bomber?
Bus differs from Footbridge in far too many ways to constitute a
‘‘minimal test case.” But an extended history of looking at minimal
test cases has left the asymmetry still quite opaque to most of us,
so perhaps it is worthwhile trying another methodology.
Using hand-held remote devices, students in my introductory
ethics classes are able to respond rapidly and anonymously to
hypothetical scenarios like Switch, Footbridge, Loop, and Bus.
Moreover, I am able to pose a series of subsequent questions,
and also to re-sample their intuitive judgments over time. This is
far from any approved experimental protocol, but I am far from
being an experimenter, and I thought experimenters (as well as
theorists and philosophers) might find it worthwhile to see what
this informal method of questioning and sampling yields.
When my students are given Switch, Footbridge, and Loop, their
responses follow the well-known, asymmetric patterns. When I
pose Bus at a subsequent class meeting, a strong majority answers
yes, one should push the large man onto the bomber (most
recently, 70% answered yes and 28% answered no; n = 42).3 Some-
how, in this scenario, any model-free aversion to use of one’s mus-
cles to forcefully push a man to a violent death does not show up
as a preponderant, immediate rejection of the act.
Now consider a candidate for the Y quadrant of our matrix:
Beckon. A runaway trolley is speeding down the track, its driver
slumped over the controls, apparently unconscious. Ahead on the
tracks are five workers, who do not see the trolley coming, and
who soon will be struck and killed. You are standing at some dis-
tance from the track, with no ability to turn the train or warn
the men. A large man, whose weight is sufficient to stop the trolley,hy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
Intervention harming one to 
save five should not be done, 
according to most subjects
Intervention harming one to 
save five should be done, 
according to most subjects
Use of direct muscular force 
to inflict harm
Footbridge X
No use of direct muscular 
force to inflict harm 
Y Switch, Loop
Fig. 1. Trolley problem ‘‘intuitive” judgments.
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He is unable to see the oncoming trolley owing to a traffic signal
box that blocks his view up the track. If you would beckon to him
[I pantomime an encouraging beckoning gesture], he would step
forward onto the track, and be immediately struck and killed. This
would halt the trolley and save the five workers. Should you beckon
to the large man?
When given the Beckon scenario, a fairly strong majority of my
introductory students will answer no (most recently, 58% no vs.
42% yes; n = 38; for comparison, in Footbridge 59% answered no
vs. 41% answering yes; n = 44).
Might there be a cached, model-free strong negative valuation
of making a gesture that lures a distant person into mortal danger?
Consider for comparison another case I offer to my students:
Wave. A runaway trolley is speeding down the track, its driver
slumped over the controls, apparently unconscious. Ahead on the
tracks are five workers, who do not see the trolley coming, and
who soon will be struck and killed. A wall prevents them from mov-
ing to their left to avoid the trolley, but there is space to their right.
You are standing at some distance from the track, with no ability to
turn the train. The workers are facing in your direction, and if you
were to wave to their right with your arms [I pantomime an
encouraging waving gesture], the five workers on the track would
step off and escape injury. However, a single worker who is closer
to you and standing to the left of the track, and who also does not
see the trolley, will see you wave, and he will step onto the track,
and immediately be hit and killed. Should you wave to the
workers?
In Wave, a strong majority answer yes (most recently, 87% yes
vs. 13% no; n = 38; for comparison, in Switch, 85% yes vs. 13% no;
n = 45). In other words, Beckon and Wave exhibit the same intu-
itive asymmetry as Footbridge and Switch, yet the immediate
action (an encouraging hand gesture) is virtually the same in each,
and there is no personal violence in either. To be sure, Beckon does
use a man as a means, like Footbridge. But it does so at a distance,
like Loop. Why, then, is beckoning disapproved by the majority
while switching the trolley in Loop is approved by the majority
(most recently, 90% answered yes to switching the trolley in Loop,
7% answered no; n = 41)?
An advantage of using anonymous sampling of intuitive reac-
tions in a classroom setting is that it permits exploration of further
dimensions of the questions with the same students, who more-
over have shared the experience of seeing the overall results of
previous polling. Nothing is hidden. This approach loses a great
deal of the experimental control typical of moral psychology
experiments, and is no substitute for them, but it does provide a
different kind of data, since students in effect become co-
investigators into their own moral intuitions. This, they tell me,
gives them a strong motivation to respond to questions in earn-
est—they have a keen curiosity about finding out what people,
themselves included, ‘‘really think,” and would like very much toPlease cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
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idea of electronic polling as a useful source of information, see
Stowell & Nelson, 2007 and Kennedy & Cutts, 2005).
Pushing our shared exploration further, I ask the students, ‘‘If
you were to learn that your roommate or friend had pulled the
lever in Switch [or pushed the man in Footbridge, etc.], would
you trust him or her the same, more, or less?” This might seem a
very vague and impressionistic question, but students readily
responded. In the case of pulling the lever in Switch, students as
a whole expressed no net change in level of trust (in the most
recent year, 26% answered more, 56% answered the same, and
18% answered less; n = 39). When asked the same question about
pushing the man in Footbridge, students as a whole expressed a
sharp loss of trust (most recently, 0% answered more, 21%
answered the same, and 78% answered less; n = 33). If I subse-
quently pose the same questions about Wave and Beckon, and
the same asymmetry emerges (most recently, in Wave, 20%
answered more, 68% answered the same, and 13% answered less;
n = 40; in Beckon, 0% answered more, 21% answered the same,
and 79% answered less; n = 42). Thus, despite the differences in
the concrete kinds of acts performed in Switch vs. Footbridge as
opposed to Wave vs. Beckon, students might be modeling an
abstract similarity in the two pairs of cases. A strong majority asso-
ciate performance of the lethal act in Footbridge and Beckon with
untrustworthiness, but not in the case of the lethal act in Switch or
Wave. I’m tempted to say, that given my students’ implicit causal/
evaluative model of the cases, learning the fact that someone
pushed in Footbridge or beckoned in Beckon supported an inverse
inference attributing to this person a less trustworthy motivational
structure than before.
Were the students picking up on anything real, or was this a
generic effect of distrusting a person who would perform an act
they judged wrong? Yet in the class in question, 41% of students
had earlier given the answer that they thought they should push
the man in Footbridge, while no students indicated increased trust
in a person who performed this act, and 78% indicated increased
distrust. Similarly, 42% had answered that they should beckon in
Beckon, but no students indicated increased trust in someone
who has beckoned, and 79% indicated increased distrust. See
Table 1 for a summary (the most frequent response is underlined).
If we turn to the experimental literature, it seems there is evi-
dence supporting the students’ distrust response. Kahane,
Everett, Earp, Farias, and Savulescu (2015) found that disposition
to push the man in Footbridge correlated with a higher score on
a psychopathy scale and a lower score on an altruism scale.
Bartels and Pizarro (2011) and Gao and Tang (2013) also found a
positive correlation between giving the ‘‘push” answer in Foot-
bridge and higher score on a psychopathy scale. A number of stud-
ies have found decreased levels of empathy, harm-aversion, and
perspective-taking in those giving push-like responses in
Footbridge-style scenarios (Conway & Gawronski, 2013;
Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013; Weich et al., 2013). And Duke and
Begue (2015) found that rate of giving the push verdict inhy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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concentration, an effect they attributed to alcohol’s impairment
of social cognition and empathy, combined with its reduction of
executive function. At a more abstract level, Uhlmann, Zhu, and
Tannenbaum (2013) found evidence that an implicit imputation
of personality characteristics mediated judgments in sacrificial
dilemmas. And in a similar vein, Sripada (2012) used structural
equations analysis to develop evidence that an implicit imputation
of underlying personality characteristics (a ‘‘deep self”) mediated
the well-known asymmetry in judgments of intentionality in the
‘‘Knobe Effect” (Knobe, 2010).
What happens in subjects’ or students’ minds when they are
posed hypothetical moral scenarios? In effect, they are being asked
to do what their default mode does for a living—to project and
evaluate an imagined situation and array of possible responses,
drawing upon cognitive and affective resources to simulate the
consequences and the states of mind of those involved. Neu-
roimaging studies indicate that such simulation takes place spon-
taneously when hearing hypothetical scenarios, whether or not
the subject is specifically instructed to place herself in the agential
role (Decety et al., 2012). My speculation is that when students
attempt to mentally simulate pushing the man off the footbridge,
they typically encounter significant affective resistance—it is
harder to ‘‘see themselves” pushing the man in Footbridge as
opposed to pulling the lever in Switch or Loop. This effect may arise
in part from a rapid empathic distress response, discussed above,
which is experienced by neuro-typical people when they imagine
taking certain kinds of harmful actions (Blair, 2007). But this dis-
tress reaction is usually not the whole of the empathic response,
which, as we saw, tends to evolve quickly to include perspective
change and affective concern (Thirioux et al., 2014). My specula-
tion is that, in mentally simulating moral scenarios, we view them
from multiple perspectives in space and time—implicitly asking
how the act would feel, what it would look like to others, what
one would feel afterwards, how one would explain oneself, and
so on. All very rapidly—this sort of personal and social ‘‘mental
construction” and evaluation is, after all, one of the main tasks
our mind was built to perform, and perform reasonably well
(Buckner et al., 2008; Hassabis & Maguire, 2009; Seligman et al.,
2013, 2016). I would speculate that, in the case of Footbridge, sim-
ulating pushing the man ‘‘feels” aversive, ‘‘looks” surprising and
callous, ‘‘seems” as if it would be hard to defend; in Switch or Loop,
I further speculate, simulating pulling the lever does not generate
these negatively-valenced ‘‘seemings”—indeed, simulating stand-
ing by and doing nothing while five die rather than one is likely
to ‘‘feel” callous. One can imagine, in Switch, bystanders shouting,
‘‘Quick—throw the switch!” Can one imagine them shouting in
Footbridge, ‘‘Quick—throw the man!”?
A person who, when simulating Footbridge, doesn’t feel a strong
resistance and sense of alarm or callousness in contemplating
pushing, or who doesn’t ‘‘sense” the shock and appearance ofPlease cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
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the difficulty of coming to peace with, or defending, the act after
the fact, is someone whose underlying affect and motivation
system is displaced from the normal range. And if the evidence
and my students are to be believed, the displacement is more in
the direction of moral indifference than moral altruism, and more
in the direction of untrustworthiness than assurance.
The often-noticed feature of ‘‘impersonality” in Loop and Switch
emerge in this context in a different light. It is a terrible thing to
sacrifice one to save five, but an emergency can make this neces-
sary. What we learn about someone’s motivational structure from
her performing such an act depends upon the likelihood that some-
one with typical feelings would willingly perform the action. And
‘‘impersonality” makes it more likely that someone with typical
feelings could bring herself to do so. So a person who pulls the
lever in Switch or Loop inspires neither greater nor lesser trust.
(On the brain’s construction of personality models, see Hassabis
et al., 2014.)
‘‘Impersonality,” however, is an abstract characteristic, medi-
ated by a model of agents in situations, and not a merely concrete
feature of the action. If I ask my students, ‘‘When you visualized
this scenario, which potential victim seemed to you most proxi-
mate?,” this, too, seems like a vague and impressionistic question.
Yet once more they readily responded. And again an interesting
pattern emerged (see Table 2; the most frequent response is
underlined).
Imaginative proximity to the single victim is as high in Beckon
as it is in Footbridge, despite the greater physical distance and the
lack of any contact or force. Indeed, in Beckon all the force comes
from the victim—and that may help explain the scenario’s effect,
since inducing his agential force requires that one engage with
the victim as an intentional agent, upon whose trust one is relying
in getting him to understand and follow one’s gesture. This brings
that victim imaginatively close in a way such that a willingness to
act in Beckon inspires a loss of trust in my students equal to a will-
ingness to act in Footbridge. The same surprising sang froid and
seeming callousness would be needed.
Isn’t there a similar imaginative engagement with the victim in
Wave? Not quite. In Wave one is counting on the group to see and
respond to one’s waving, but not counting on the victim in partic-
ular doing so. Hence all six are, according to most of my students,
imaginatively most proximate. (Interestingly, though perhaps not
in a statistically significant way, fewer students say the individual
victim is imaginatively most proximate in Wave than in Switch,
16% vs. 28%, and more students say that the five who would be
saved are most proximate, 25% vs. 9%. After all, in Wave one is
counting upon the five to understand and follow one’s gesture,
but not upon the sixth.)
As a test, let us return to Bus, which shows a strikingly different
pattern from either Footbridge and Beckon, on the one hand, or
Switch and Wave, on the other. In the matter of trust, only in
Bus does a roommate or friend who takes action to intervene gain
in net trustworthiness (see Table 1). And only in Bus are the five
people potentially saved imaginatively most proximate (see
Table 2). These two facts are, I believe, related to what it is like
to simulate Bus using a causal/evaluative model of the scenario
as a whole. Bus is unlike the other cases because it involves a back-
ground threat that is shared by the whole population, since all are
at risk when terror-bombing is common—‘‘we are all in this
together,” so to speak. That changes the framing of pushing the
one individual who could block the bomber’s entry into the bus.
A simulation of pushing the man in this setting can be ‘‘felt” to
be a form of group self-defense, a desperate and bloodly act, but
the kind of response needed to foil terrorists and save as many
as possible in a society under threat. Note that only in Bus doeshy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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P. Railton / Cognition xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 15one enter the scenario imaginatively ‘‘among” the potential vic-
tims, and only in Bus are the five who would be saved highly imag-
inatively proximate as a group. Someone who can act as required
to minimize the loss of life under the pressure of such dire circum-
stances may inspire increased, not decreased, trust. Related evi-
dence comes from the experimental result of Lucas and
Livingston (2014), who found that inducing a greater sense of ‘‘so-
cial connectedness” among subjects who are considering trolley-
like dilemmas also increased the rate approving action to protect
the five potential victims, even when this involved giving
‘‘push”-type responses in Footbridge-like dilemmas.5.5. Normative issues
The persistent intuitive ‘‘sense” that pushing in Footbridge is
morally problematic could thus be grounded in a model-based rep-
resentation that includes agents as well as actions, a modeling that
would support an inverse inference—which appears to be accu-
rate—from a stronger disposition to push to a greater likelihood
that the agent in question is more callous and less empathic than
normal, hence less trustworthy.
Numerous historically-important moral theories are centered in
the first instance upon the evaluation of agents and their attitudes,
not acts. According to many virtue theorists, for example, whether
an act ought to be performed in a given circumstance is to be
answered indirectly, by understanding how a virtuous person
would see and think about the situation and the act, and whether
she would be motivated to perform it (for discussion, see Annas,
2004). And many of the most important figures in the utilitarian
tradition, including Hume and John Stuart Mill (1863/2001), have
placed questions of cultivating moral sentiments and fellow feel-
ing, encouraging general types of actions, and promoting better
social relations—rather than a theory of optimal individual acts—
at the center of their thinking about how a concern for the common
good is to be applied in practice. It could well be true that the kinds
of sensibilities, attitudes, motivational structures, and interper-
sonal relations it would be best overall for people to develop,
would also dispose them to push the lever in Switch but not to
push the man off the Footbridge. Or to wave at the workers in
Wave but not to beckon the man in Beckon. Or to push the man
in Bus.
There is nothing irrational about this. Most human goods, and
especially such life-sustaining goods as friendship, family, social
solidarity, mutual respect, and humane caring, depend not only
upon the acts performed but upon the attitudes, affect, and will
of those involved. Our implicit causal/evaluative models are devel-
oped over a life-experience that begins with a long period of
dependence upon others in which, as we’ve seen, sensitivity to
the good or ill will others, and motivation to understand and help
them, emerge early and remain important. When simulating thesePlease cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
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sense that there is likely something amiss in the underlying psy-
chology of a person who would spontaneously throw the man off
the bridge in Footbridge or beckon the man in Beckon, and that a
society composed of people with such psychologies would not be
a better place.
My students needn’t mistakenly think their own motivational
structure would change if they pushed in Footbridge, or that the
general undesirability of a motivational structure compatible with
willingly pushing in Footbridge is a decisive reason to let five peo-
ple die ‘‘impersonally” in order to avoid ‘‘personally” killing one.
Indeed, by the end of a term of introductory ethics, typically, fewer
students are confident that they should not perform this bare, sin-
gular act (in a recent instance, 56% answered yes to pushing by the
end of term, 44% no; n = 54). From this we cannot conclude that
they are right. But if my students—even those who have concluded
that this bare, singular act is what the situation might require—
were to sense that there is more than unthinking habit involved
in reluctance to embrace this conclusion, would they be wrong?
5.6. Realistic trolley problems?
If deeper causal/evaluative modeling of agents and actions
explains the persistence and force of the intuitive asymmetries in
trolley problems, we should be able to get different intuitive
dynamics in otherwise similar cases that remove direct agency.
Interestingly, there are now such cases before us as a society:
Should we legislate how self-driving vehicles are to be pro-
grammed to respond in emergency situations?
When I first ask my students whether self-driving vehicles
should be programmed to swerve to the side to avoid five pedestri-
ans in a cross-walk, even though this would cause the death of one
pedestrian on a side walkway, a majority typically answers yes, in a
response reminiscent of Switch (most recently, 82% answered yes,
while 18% answered no; n = 33). Yet when I ask whether such cars
should be programmed to swerve to avoid five pedestrians in a
cross-walk, even though this would cause the vehicle to collide
with a side wall, killing the rider in the car, the majority verdict
flips (most recently, only 38% of the students answered yes, while
62% answered no; n = 37), a response reminiscent of Footbridge. In
effect, this pair of realistic ‘‘trolley problems” reproduces the asym-
metry in verdicts found in Switch and Footbridge (for a similar
result, see Bonnefon, Shariff, & Rahwan, 2016).
Or does it? Let’s test the robustness of this asymmetry. Typi-
cally, at the next class session, I ask the students whether, in imag-
ining the original emergency scenarios, they put themselves in the
point of view of someone riding in the car or someone outside the
car. And here we find an interesting asymmetry paralleling the
first: a majority had placed themselves imaginatively in the car
(most recently, 66% vs. 34%; n = 35). Once they’ve seen this result,
I ask again about programming the car to swerve into a wall to
avoid killing five pedestrians, even if this kills the rider. The answer
typically changes markedly (most recently, 57% answered yes, 43%
no; n = 35). If I ask the same question again a week later, the orig-
inal asymmetry is typically almost gone (most recently, 63%
answered yes, 37% no; n = 33). In other words, an asymmetry that
at first seemed as stark as Switch vs. Footbridge has largely disap-
peared, as students continue to think about the problem, encour-
aged only to vary their perspective.
Contrast this rapid re-evaluation with the original trolley prob-
lems, which, after many years and thousands of articles, continue
for most who study them to exhibit the same intuitive asymmetry.
The initial asymmetry in the case of self-driving cars is not ‘‘deep”
or persistent, I conjecture, because the locus of agency has been
moved to the question of what general algorithmic principles we,
as a society of sometime-drivers and sometime-pedestrians, wouldhy moral? And why now?. Cognition (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
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risk—we do not have to worry about the ‘‘psychology” of the driver.
That model-based simulation and evaluation might be at the
bottom of the trolley asymmetry coheres with the evidence offered
in Amit and Greene (2012). They note that fMRI studies of trolley
problems (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004;
Greene et al., 2001) have consistently found two key patterns.
The first is the now-familiar fact that considering ‘‘personal harm”
dilemmas like Footbridge is associated with greater activation in
certain areas associated with affective processing, and lower acti-
vation in certain areas concerned with task-based controlled cogni-
tion. And the second is that considering ‘‘personal harm” dilemmas
also elicited greater activity in the default mode network, which, as
we saw earlier, appears to be the core system by which the brain
draws upon episodic and semantic memory to attribute mental
states to others and to simulate and evaluate real or hypothetical
actions (Buckner et al., 2008). This suggests that model-based sim-
ulation and evaluation might be relatively more active in assessing
‘‘personal harm” dilemmas like Footbridge and Beckon, rather than
less. In ‘‘impersonal harm” cases like Switch, simulation makes the
fates of all six potential victims imaginatively proximate (see again
Table 2), facilitating mental processing in terms of a straightfor-
ward comparison of overall benefits and costs, rather than vivid
simulation of actions and outcomes.
Moreover, Amit and Greene (2012) found that introducing a
task that interferes with visualization tends to increase the rate of
‘‘cost/benefit” responses in Footbridge cases and their ilk. Visual-
ization appears to draw upon a neural network that overlaps
extensively with default mode simulation of actions and imputa-
tion of mental states (Hassabis & Maguire, 2009). Thus interference
with visualization would likely disrupt deeper simulation and
favor shallower processing and straightforward cost/benefit calcu-
lation. Similarly, patients with vmPFC damage or frontotemporal
dementia are reported to have difficulty imagining or empathically
simulating the affective states of others, and so they, too, might be
more likely to use relatively shallower processing to give a simple
cost/benefit response in Footbridge-like cases—and indeed they do
have a higher rate of push-like verdicts (Koenigs et al., 2007). Moll
and Oliveira-Souza (2007) suggest that an intact vmPFC and fron-
topolar cortex might be essential for the distinctive combination of
cognition and affect that constitutes appropriate moral sentiment.
What, then, about ‘‘moral dumbfounding”? Given the relative
opacity of implicit processing, it might be unsurprising that sub-
jects find it difficult to explain their persistent intuitive resistance
to Julie and Mark’s incestuous act. But what model-based explana-
tion would account for this persistence, given the absence of mali-
cious intent or bad consequences? Consider:
Janet & Matt are brother and sister. They are traveling together in
France on summer vacation from college. One night they are stay-
ing alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be
interesting and fun if they tried playing Russian Roulette. At very
least it would be a new experience for each of them. Fortunately,
when the spin the revolver’s chambers, neither of them lands on
the bullet. They both enjoy playing Russian roulette, but they decide
not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which
makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think
about that, was it OK for them to play Russian roulette?The case of Janet & Matt has the same benign consequences as
the case of Julie & Mark, but now the reason why their action
wasn’t OK is very evident to us. Though their intent was not mali-
cious, their thinking was reckless, and our causal/evaluative mod-
eling of actions is modal, incorporating risks as well as actual
outcomes. If the gun had gone off, either Janet or Matt would be
dead, the other would have a lifetime of regret, and family andPlease cite this article in press as: Railton, P. Moral learning: Why learning? W
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simulation of their decision-making, as viewed from multiple per-
spectives in light of multiple possible outcomes, would be unlikely
to generate an intuitive ‘‘sense” that this is an appropriate way to
enliven a dull evening. That the subjects in Haidt (2001) pointed to
such potential consequences of incest as psychic harm or traumatic
pregnancy to explain their verdicts might not be mere confabula-
tion—these were, in fact, serious risks, to which Julie and Mark
gave insufficient weight as they cast about for something fun to do.
Reinforcement learning takes place at many levels and degrees
of abstraction and generality. In any given case, elements of both
model-free and model-based learning are likely to play a role.
Indeed, recent work suggests that the systems involved in
model-free and model-based overlap extensively, and that each
may play various roles in shaping how the brain uses the other,
even in classic Pavlovian conditioning (Dayan, 2012; Dayan &
Berridge, 2014; Doll, Simon, & Daw, 2012). Model-free learning
and control might help model-based deliberation avoid the
regresses we discussed at the outset, and model-based learning
and control might monitor habitual behaviors to prevent us from
becoming oblivious to change. For complex imaginative tasks like
simulating and evaluating hypothetical scenarios, it is quite likely
that both are at work, as parts of a larger causal/evaluative model-
ing competency which generates intuitive assessments of acts, but
also of agents, practices, and traits of character—as it must if it is to
be adequate to moral thought and practice (cf. Crockett, 2013; Moll
& Oliveira-Souza, 2007).
6. Explicit and implicit moral learning
Shared consideration of our intuitive assessments—whether in
the ethics classroom, among friends, within families, through pub-
lic debates, or in psychology journals—reveals a special role for
explicit forms of moral learning which is not limited to socialization
into prevailing norms. As in the case of implicit learning of a lan-
guage or of causal relations, the implicit moral understanding at
which one arrives will be hostage to the quality of one’s learning
environment, and all particular learning environments have limita-
tions and biases—just as no method of learning is free of liabilities
(Dayan & Niv, 2008). Thus, it is especially important that, by dis-
cussing our intuitive responses together and trying to understand
their origins and import, we can share our experience and gain
some hope of reducing bias and expanding our knowledge.
Hume’s project, of trying to understand how abstract, general
causal and moral cognition could arise and acquire justification
on the basis of concrete, particular, shared experience, is a bit clo-
ser to being realized thanks to a convergence of results across a
range of fields that center on the power of learning. And it is fitting
that the resulting approach to moral psychology and neuroscience
gives a prominent role, as Hume himself did, to imaginative projec-
tion, empathic concern, non-perspectival evaluation, and the mod-
eling of agents as well as actions. These processes are not the
whole of moral psychology, as Hume realized. ‘‘General sympathy”
is the ‘‘chief source of moral distinctions” and of ‘‘most of the
virtues” (1738/1978; Conclusion of Book III), yet morality as we
find it also includes vengeful sentiments and the ‘‘limited generos-
ity” that binds together families, friends, and affiliates. But by fol-
lowing Hume in trying to see how the core of morality could be
acquired experientially in ways parallel to such paradigms of
knowledge as causal relations, we begin to glimpse what moral
learning can be.
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